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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
REDMAN WAREHOUSING CORPORATION, 
a Texas corpora ti on, 
Plaintiff-Appellants 
v. 
CLEARFIELD CITY CORPORATION, 
ROBERT O 'BLOCK and GORDON OLCH, 
d/b/a FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES, 
and WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION I 
Defendants-Respondents 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Docket No. 15159 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
This is an action by Redman Warehousing Corporation 
against the several defendants seeking reimbursement for expenses 
Redman claims it incurred in protecting property stored in Redman' s 
Warehouse. Redman claims the property was damaged by floods at 
the Freeport Center on July 13 and 19, 1973. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Second District Court for Davis County, Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist, granted summary judgment against plaintiff-
appellant and in favor of defendant-respondent, Robert O'Block 
and Gordon Olch d/b/a Freeport Center Associates which is the 
subject of this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant is a Texas corporation 
the warehousing business in Utah. 
engaged. 
(R. 1.) It stored proper: 
for defendant Whirlpool Corporation (R. 4, 20.) which Plaint;' 
claims sustained water damage as a result of floods 
on July l: 
and 19, 1973. On December 6, 1973, plaintiff filed 
a cornplai:: 
(R. 18, reverse side.) to recover damages from Whirlpool Cow· 
, .. 
tion, Clearfield and Freeport Center. Plaintiff issued summo:; 
to defendants Whirlpool and Clearfield City and caused them tc 
served during 1974. (R. 20 reverse side, 323, 324.) Theproc' 
of litigation thereafter ensued between plaintiff, Clearfield, 
Whirlpool. 
The statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff'; 
claim expired on July 19, 1976. On September 27, D76, after: 
expiration of the statutory period, and well beyond the three· 
month period after the filing of the complaint in which a SUJlllt 
must be issued (R. 204~), plaintiff issued a summons to Freeport 
Center. The summons was served upon Freeport Center on SeptemL 
29, 1976. (R. 205.) 
On October 26, 1976 (R. 2D6.), Freeport Center answere: 
plaintiff's complaint and specifically pleaded that the appli· 
cable statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claim. Freepor: 
· · · defense on the plaintif' Center based its statute of limitations 
months following the fi failure to issue a summons within three 
ing of a complaint. d f r summary Freeport Center then move o 
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judgment and filed a supporting memorandwn which argued that 
plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations be-
cause the plaintiff had failed to issue a swnmons to Freeport 
center within three months and that the plaintiff could not re-
file its complaint because the three-year statutory period had 
expired. (R. 303-308.) Plaintiff submitted an opposing memo-
randum and argued that Utah law did not require it to issue a 
surrunons to Freeport Center within three months after filing its 
complaint, and that despite its failure to issue a swnmons with-
in three months, Freeport Center was nevertheless answerable 
under the complaint filed before the statute of limitations had 
run. (R. 319-325.) The parties orally elaborated on these 
argwnents before the trial court, after which the court granted 
Freeport Center's motion for swnmary judgment and ordered that 
plaintiff's complaint against it be dismissed. (R. 346 et. seq.) 
Plaintiff appealed to this Court. (R. 338.) 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial court properly granted swnmary judgment in 
favor of defendant Freeport Center for the following three rea-
sons: 
(l) The action was barred by the statute of limi-
tations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(2) (1953); 
(2) The swnmons was not issued within the three-month 
period provided by Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction over 
-3-
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4 
defendant Freeport Center; and 
(3) The action was barred by laches. 
In its brief, plaintiff urges this Court to reverse 
judgment on these grounds: I 
(1) That the statute of limitations does not bar, I 
action because once a complaint is filed within the sta:.: 
period, it perpetually endures, and a summons may issue: 
on at any time, no matter how much time has passed since: 
filing of the complaint; 
(2) That in multiple-defendant ca<e', UtehRo1' ,,1 
Civil Procedure 4 (b) 's requirement that summons issue ·1r~ 
three months requires only that a summons be issued too: 
defendant within that time; and 
(3) That Freeport Center failed properly .to plead\ 
the defense of insufficiency of process and waived its r. 
to rely on it as a basis for summary judgment. 
Significantly, plaintiff's brief does not argue that the tria: 
court erred in ruling the a~tion barred by laches. 
In this brief, Freeport Center demonstrates that pt.\ 
tiff's arguments are unsupported by authority and that the tr::I 
court's judgment was correct and should be affirmed. 
-4-
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POINT I 
THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The parties agree that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(2) 
(1953), which requires that actions for taking, detaining or 
injuring personal property be commenced within three years, is 
the statute of limitations applicable to this case. (R. 346 et. 
~) They also agree that no summons directed to Freeport Center 
was issued within three months after the filing of the complaint, 
nor was any summons issued to or served upon Freeport Center 
until after the expiration of the three-year period following 
the accrual of plaintiff's cause of action. (R. 204, 205; 
Brief for Appellant at 2.) These facts being undisputed, the 
trial court properly dismissed the action because, inter alia, 
the statute of limitations barred it. 
Plaintiff, however, renews before this Court its argu-
ment, unsuccessful below, that the mere filing of the complaint 
within the statutory period is all that is necessary to comply with 
the statute of limitations, no matter when a summons is issued 
or served. Were plaintiff correct, a potential plaintiff could 
comply with the statute of limitations merely by filing a com-
plaint with the court but issue no summons to give the defendant 
notice of the action. Decades later, he could issue and serve a 
summons on the defendant and enforce his stale claim. Utah law, 
of course, does not permit this. Plaintiff must do more than 
file his complaint to satisfy the statute. He must also issue 
-5-
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a sununons to the defendant within three h 
mont s and serve it 
within one year. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b). If pl· · 
ain t1f f fails : 
so his action will be "deemed dismissed." Id. 
The statute's purpose, to prevent stale claims anc 
prevent the unfairness inherent in requiring a defendant to 
defend against an ancient claim is fulfilled. The defendant ! 
receive notice through service of process no later than one ys,· 
following the end of the period prescribed by the statute of 
lirni tations, and even earlier--wi thin three months-- if the pr:-
cess server does not delay. "Developments in the Law--Statutl 
of Limitations," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1185 (1950). 
Despite the inconsistency of its argument with the 1
1 
clear purposes of the statute of limitations, plaintiff argues I 
that a timely filed complaint perpetually endures and that a I 
sununons may at any time issue thereon and be served. Plainti:'I 
cites Askwith v. Ellis, 85 Utah 103, 38 P.2d 757 (1934), as sJ 
port for this position. As the trial court recognized, plain:. 
is in error and Askwith, a 1934 case, has been overruled by t.\s 
adoption of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b). . h ~ I In~,~.
Court held that although Utah R.S. § 104-5-5 (1933), the stat'· 
tory predecessor of Rule 4 (b) , required that a summons be issus: 
within three months, failure to do so was not fatal because tie 
· 1 of an action if statute made no provision for the dismissa 
the three-month issuance or one-year service plaintiff breached 
requirements. The opinion states: 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There is no provision ~n the statute by which an action 
ceases to exist; by which an action terminates, ends, is 
dismissed . . · because no summons has been issued or 
served. It may well be that such a rule would be advis-
able, salutory and just, but it is the duty of the Legis-
lature and not of the courts to make such the law. 
Askwith v. Ellis, supra, at 38 P. 2d 759 [emphasis supplied]. 
The drafters of the present Rule 4(b) adopted this 
court's suggestion in Askwith by providing that an action would 
be "deemed dismissed" for violating its requirement that summons 
be timely issued and served: 
If an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint, 
summons must issue thereon within three months from the 
date of such filing. Summons must be served within one 
year after the filing of the complaint, or the action 
will be deemed dismissed. 
UtahR. Civ. P. 4(b). 
Since Rule 4(b) was adopted, this Court has twice had 
occasion to consider the effect of a plaintiff's failure to 
issue or serve a summons within the proper time limits. In 
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 18 Utah 2d 101, 417 P.2d 118 (1966), the 
defendant had been served beyond the one year Rule 4(b) allows 
but defendant waited until appeal to contend that the district 
court had no j ursidiction over her. This Court stated: 
She would be correct under the rule except she counter-
claimed, sought relief, got part of that for which she 
asked, and now complains that with all this she should 
receive the benefits of the lower court's decision but 
not the bitter fruits thereof. 
~· at 417 P. 2d 119 [emphasis supplied]. 
Later, in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Dietrich, 
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25 Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970), this Court f 1· 
aced a sit:, 
in which service was proper, but the summo 
ns served had not: 
issued within three months as Rule 4(b) requires. I FollowiJ: ! 
service of the untimely issued summons on the defendant, tf.E ; 
plaintiff served a writ of garnishment on his employer in er: 1 
to intercept his wages. This Court ruled that the lower co,~· 
had no jurisdiction over the defendant, even though the gar~: 
rather than the defendant appeared to contest the court's j·~. 
diction over him.* Thus Fibreboard makes clear that the dis:_· 
sal language in Rule 4 (b) applies to untimely issuance as we:.\ 
untimely service since the service in Fibreboard was timely. I 
In the present case, the defendant its elf, Freeport 
Center, appeared to contest the untimely issued summons. The I 
trial court ruled, consistent with Sorenson and Fibreboard,~: 
since plaintiff failed to issue a summons to Fre~port Center I 
within three months, the court had no jurisdiction and there· 
fore dismissed the action. 
I 
*This Court's decision in Fibreboard, supra, is in 1
1 
accord with decisions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procec~ 
The Federal Rules differ from Utah's in that ~he. fe~eral co~.: 
1
. 
clerk, a public official, rather than the plaintiff s attor 1 
issues the summons and must issue it within a rea~onable tlll!e;.
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (a). Even though a public official ha7 ;~e.:; 
to issue the summons, federal courts have dismissed act10 .be;··:1 
although the complaint was filed within the peri'?d pres~~\erJ 
the statute of limitations, the summon~ ~as not issu~dclovis, I 
within a reasonable time. Murphy v. Citizens Bank o . troa" 
244 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1957) (13 months); Fistel v. Chn§__...::'l 
13 F.R.D. 245 (W.D. Pa. 1952) (10-1/2 months)· 
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Had plaintiff not waited until the statute of limita-
tions expired, the complaint could have been refiled and a new 
sUJ11Il\ons properly issued and served. But its delay prevented it 
from reinstating the action, and the trial court therefore pro-
perly held plaintiff's claim barred by the statute of limitations. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF VIOLATED RULE 4(b) BY FAILING 
TO ISSUE A SUMMONS TO EACH DEFENDANT 
WITHIN THREE MONTHS AFTER FILING ITS 
COMPLAINT. 
Plaintiff argues in its brief is that Rule 4(b) re-
quires a summons to issue to only one defendant within three 
months in a multiple -defendant action. Plaintiff contends that 
by issuing a summons to one of the defendants within three months, 
its delay of almost two years in issuing a summons to Freeport 
Center did not violate the Rule. 
Plaintiff is attempting to twist the plain meaning of 
Rule 4(b). That rule provides: 
If an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint, 
summons must issue thereon within three months from the 
date of such filing. The summons must be served within 
one year after the filing of the complaint or the action 
will be deemed dismissed, provided that in any action 
brought against two or more defendants in which personal 
service has been obtained upon one of them within the 
year, the other or others may be served or appear at 
any time before trial. 
The Rule contains two general statements--that summons 
must issue within three months and that it must be served within 
a year. The proviso which follows, allowing all but one defen-
-9-
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II 
dant in a multiple-defendant case to be served any t' l 
-- ll11ebe•·1 
trial unmistakably reveals that without the proviso th '·· 
, e ge~,. 
statement requiring service within a year would apply ·1 
to al! 
defendants. Since the Rule omits a proviso for issuance of 1 
process in multiple defendant actions, one can only conclude I 
that the general statement requiring issuance within three mo:j 
In addition, plaintiff fails to appreciate I the pur;c, 
applies to all defendants. 
underlying the proviso allowing delayed service in multiple· 
defendant cases. The proviso contemplates that defendants ma; 
difficult to find, and allows the court to assert jurisdictio:I 
over all defendants provided the plaintiff does all that it ca:. 
I 
to enable the court to obtain jurisdiction: files a complaint.I 
issues a summons to each defendant, and obtains service on at I 
least one defendant. Issuance lies completely within the pla~-1 
tiff's control. All he need do is "place [a summons] in the I 
hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service." ~ 
Civ. p. 4 (a) . A proviso relieving the plaintiff of the simple I 
task, completely within his control, of placing a summons in ::•j 
hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service woulG I 
::::s:u::s l::i:::i:~:::::u:~ was accordingly omitt•d "' I 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT RAISE FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL FREEPORT CENTER'S 
ALLEGED FAILURE TO PRESERVE ITS DEFENSE 
OF INSUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS. 
Plaintiff for the first time contends that Freeport 
center failed to raise the issue of insufficiency of process in 
its answer or by a motion pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (4) and has 
therefore waived it. On the contrary, Freeport Center did chal-
lenge the sufficiency of process in its answer by specifically 
pleading the statue of limitations when the only basis for the 
statute of limitations defense was the insufficiency of an untimely 
issued summons. (R. 206.) Freeport Center su~cessfully argued 
that the untimely issued summons did not give the court jurisdic-
tion over it, and that the statute of limitations had expired, 
preventing plaintiff from refiling the complaint. Plaintiff 
admits as much in its brief to this Court: "The basis of defen-
dant's Statute of Limitations defense is the purported insuffic-
iency of the process served on them on September 29, 1976." 
Brief for Appellant at 8. 
Moreover, whether Freeport Center should technically 
have plead the defense of insufficiency of process rather than 
statute of limitations is now irrelevant before this Court. 
Plaintiff made no objection before the trial court and, indeed, 
argued the merits of the defense orally and in its memorandum. 
(R. 319-322, 346 et. seq.) As this Court has held many times, it 
-11-
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is a fundamental tenet of our judicial system that an . · 
lSSt; ' 
not be raised for the first time on appeal. Thompson D~I 
v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973); state~\ 
Through Road Comm'n v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295 495 1 
, p. 2d 811::1 
Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971); ~ 
General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970); Ir. 
Ekker's Estate, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967); Riterv~ 
19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967); Hamilton v. Salt Lake Cc:• 
Sewerage Improvement District No. l, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390 P.J 
I 
( 19 6 4) ; Dolores Uranium Corp. v. Jones, 14 Utah 2d 280, 382 p I 
I 883 (1963); Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375! .. 
I 
I 
456 (1962); Carson v. Douglas, 12 Utah 2d 424, 367 P.2d 462 I 
(1962); Huber v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 6 Utah 2d 15, 305 P.2a:-1 
(1956); Flemetis v. McArthur, 119 Utah 268, 226 P.2d 124 lB11 1 
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., ll8 Utah 600,:\ 
P.2d 577 (1950); Neilson v. Eisen, 116 Utah 343, 209 P.2d 921 
(1949); Drummond v. Union Pac. R. Co., 111 Utah 289, 177 P.1c I 
903 (1947). 11 
Another rationale compels the same conclusion. Rule I 
15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted to prei;:\ 
f l · l d · d f cts as a basi' s for exclut\ a party ram re ying on p ea ing e e 
issues actually tried by the court: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 11 
express or implied consent of the parties, they s~a d 
be treated in all respects as if they had been. ra~s:5 in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleading . 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evi-
-12-
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dence and to raise th~se issues may be made upon motion 
of any party at any tllTle, even after judgment, but 
failure so to amend does not affect the result or-the 
trial of these issues. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15 (b) (emphasis supplied]. This Court, consis-
tent with the position taken by the federal courts, has construed 
Rule 15(b) to prevent a party from assigning as error on appeal 
the failure of the pleadings to raise issues which were subse-
quently tried by express or implied consent before the lower 
court. This Court has quoted from Moore's Federal Practice: 
At the trial Rule 15 enables the case to be litiaged 
on the merits. It does this in two ways: (a) in effect 
pleadings are automatically amended to conform to proof 
on issues tried by express or implied consent. • . • 
The sporting element in litigation is ~liminated •••• 
This is true because Rule 15(b) provides: 'Such amendment 
of the pleading as may be necessary to cause them to con-
form to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made 
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, 
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues.' 
Moore's Federal Practice, § 15.02 at 805 (2d ed. 1948), quoted 
!:E_ Draper v. J.B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 P.2d 
360 (1952). 
Later, in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 
86 (1963), this Court held that where an affirmative defense was 
not properly plead but the merit of the affirmative defense was 
tried before the lower court, Rule lS(b) required that it be 
presumed that the defense had been properly plead. This Court 
noted that the rule allowed the pleadings to be amended to con-
form to the proof actually received in the trial, and further 
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4 
provided, "failure so to amend d t ff 
oes no a ect the result c: ·' 
trial of these issues." Id Ut h R c · p 
__ .; a . 1.V. • 15(b). 
Plaintiff, having argued the merits of Freeport Ce:~ 
defense of insufficiency of process without objection before ' 
lower court, cannot now for the first time raise the issuec,, 
this Court. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY LACHES. I 
The trial court also granted Freeport Center's mot:I 
for summary judgment because of laches. (R. 327-328, 346 J 
Plaintiff-appellant, in its brief, totally ignored this gro[:f 
granting the motion. As this Court has stated: 
The rule is well-settled that a judgment is endowed 
with a preswnption of validity; that the party attack· ! 
ing it has the burden of affirmatively showing that it 
is in error; and that the evidence and all inferences 
that fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to it. 
1 Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 89 (1963);~ 
also Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 i.:.I 
399 (1970); Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d lli · 
(1961). Having ignored the ground of laches, plaintiff hasc 
met his burden to prove the judgment in error, and it theref:: 
must stand. 
Moreover, this Court has long recognized the defen:' 
laches. Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse Shopping~ 
535 P. 2d 1256 (Utah, 1975); Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 11: 
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232 P.2d 769 (1951); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d 
S28 (1943); Jones Min. Co. v. Cardiff Min. & Mill. co., 56 Utah 
449, 191 P.426 (1920). 
In Papanikolas, this Court recited the elements of the 
defense: 
(l) The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; 
(2) An injury to defendant owing to such lack of 
diligence. 
Papanikolas, supra, at 535 P.2d 1260. The record contains ample 
evidence to support the trial court's determination that plaintiff 
was guilty of laches. The numerous letters which passed between 
the parties reveal that plaintiff was aware from the very beginning 
of the pertinent facts which it claims make Freeport Center liable 
to it. (R. 230-252.) Just over one year after the flood, plaintiff 
filed its complaint, naming Freeport Center as a defendant. But 
it waited for two years, for no reason apparent from the record, 
until after the statute of limitations had run, before issuing a 
swrunons to or serving Freeport Center. 
In addition to unreasonable delay on plaintiff's part, 
the record shows prejudice to Freeport Center resulting from the 
delay. Because of the late date on which Freeport was finally 
served Freeport may be barred by the applicable statutes of 
limitations from asserting its cross-claim against Clearfield for 
indemnity in the event that Freeport should be found liable. (R. 
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209.) Defendant Whirlpool's third-party complaint for 
inde:., 
nity against Clearfield was dismissed for this · 
very reason I 
330-331.); Freeport Center's cross-claim could suffer ' 
the s~ I 
fate. ' 
In view of plaintiff's abdication of its burden:c 
show error on the part of the trial court and the evidence::. 
the record sufficient to support the decision, the trial ccc::. 
judgment that plaintiff's claim is barred by laches must be : 
sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of showina 
the trial court's judgment erroneous. 
First, plaintiff failed to issue a summons to Freed 
Center within the time required by the Utah Rules of· Civil Pr:· 
cedure, and has not shown that the trial court erred in disi:' I 
ing the action on that ground. I 
second, plaintiff's argument that once a complaint· 1 
filed a sununons may be issued thereon and served at any time: I 
even in violation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and i::'I 
the statute of limitations has expired, rests on 
' 
' 
overruled a-r.\ 
ority and unsound principle. i 
Third, plaintiff's brief does not even contend tha: I 
the court erred in dismissing the action on the ground of lac';I 
Finally, plaintiff's procedural point that Freepor: 
-16-
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center did not timely raise its defense of insufficiency of pro-
cess is factually incorrect and, in any event, has been waived by 
plaintiff's failure to raise the matter before the trial court. 
IT IS THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED that the Second 
District Court for Davis County committed no error, and that its 
judgment against plaintiff Redman Warehousing Corporation in favor 
of Robert O'Block and Gordon Olch d/b/a Freeport Center Associates 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Robert O'Block and Gordon Olch 
d/b/a Freeport Center Associates 
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The under signed hereby certifies that he delivere" 
a copy of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to Mr. Robert w. 
Miller of Nelson, Harding, Richards, Leonard & Tate, 48 Post 
Office Place, Salt Lake City, Utah, Attorneys for Appellant, 
this 
,,;, j 
day of August, 1977. 
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